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Fig. 1: The consequences of abormal eyeless activation can be seen in these ectopic eyes 
on the antenna of a fruit fly (Photo: Courtesy of Andreas Hefti and Georg Haider, 
Biocenter, University of Basel). This picture was reproduced in the majority of 
newspapers and journals reporting on the experiment. 
FRANKENSTEINIAN KNOWLEDGE? 
1. Monster flies 
Scientific knowledge is experimental knowledge. Such knowledge 
can be seen as "forbidden," either because the experiments leading to that 
knowledge are seen as immoral, or because interventions made possible 
by that knowledge could be morally offensive. There is currently an in-
teresting case in the realm of genetic engineering, in which moral 
condemnations have been forthcoming but have not been unanimous. 
Here I present an analysis of this heterogeneity of moral assessment in the 
hope that this study of a single case might be helpful for the discussion of 
bioethical generalizations around the category of the "forbidden." 
A team consisting of Walter J. Gehring, Georg Haider and Patrick 
Callaerts (Biocenter, University of Basel) activated a gene called eyeless 
in parts of the Drosophila larvae where it is not normally active. As a con-
sequence those parts of the animal grew extra eyes. The experimental flies 
had eyes on the wings, on the legs, on the antennae or in place of the 
antennae. Some flies had as many as 14 fully developed eyes (10 addi-
tional eyes), each with the hexagonal ommatidia, interommatidial bristles, 
lenses, and with a normal number and trapezoidal arrangement of the rha-
bodomeres of photoreceptors that make up the normal structure of a 
Drosophila eye. 
The front page of the International Herald Tribune of March 25-26, 
1995 announced this successful genetic induction of ectopic eyes in 
Drosophila melanogaster with the title " 'Frankensteinian' Fruit Fly Ex-
periments." What is the relation of the category 'Frankensteinian' to that 
of the 'morally forbidden'? What is the role of popular mythology in the 
public moral evaluation of scientific research? 
The original scientific publication of the experiment had appeared in 
the journal Science on the previous day. The frontispiece was a scanning 
electron-micrograph of the Drosophila head with additional facet eyes on 
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the tips of its shortened antennae (see Fig. I).2 Dozens of articles in news-
papers and broadcast messages spread the obviously sensational story of * 
genetic engineers "combining elements of the sublime and the macabre."3 „ 
What did the experiment show! For the scientists involved it was a 
test of a scientific hypothesis. For at least some part of the public it was a 
sign that something is rotten in the state of science. Here are strikingly 
different perceptions of the same real event. In this paper I want to study 
this disparity and its consequences. Although the described experiment is 
a single case, we observe here a situation where the question of "forbidden * 
knowledge" can emerge. I argue that the disparity of perception between < , 
scientists and parts of the general public is mediated by parts of different 
interpretative patterns and that these patterns can be understood ade-
quately only if the level of myth is not excluded. What are the processes * 
which lead to such questions as whether certain possible activities should ^ 
be excluded from scientific research? Perhaps a clearer understanding of 
the processes leading to this question will help in coming to terms with * 
the question itself. 
2. Aporia in a Frankensteinian ethic of research 
The most influential version of the Frankenstein story in our century 
was doubtless the James Whale movie classic Frankenstein of 1931. This * 
film became so popular that the name "Frankenstein" cannot be pro- « 
nounced today without evoking its echo.4 Therefore, it is worth looking 
more carefully at Whale's version.5 In it, Henry Frankenstein is the 
prototype of a mad scientist with the fanatic ambition to create life. He did * 
not allow even his friends to visit his laboratory because he sensed that his 4 
experiments might be violating the boundaries of morality. Together with 
his assistant, Fritz, he exhumed corpses in the churchyard, and stole parts 
of hanged criminals, and a brain out of the laboratory of his mentor, 1 
Professor Waldman. After combining these parts he bestowed life upon a
 4 
corpse by means of "chemical galvanism" and "electrobiology." The 
success intoxicated his mind; he did not respect the warnings of others, "* 
and he saw himself in a divine position. Soon afterwards, the warnings of * , 
old Waldman came true. The monster, having been brought to life, became 
aggressive: first, as a consequence of the fact that the assistant, Fritz, had 
confounded different brain preparations and had taken the brain of a * 
criminal; and second, as a consequence of the fact that the mind of the 
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creature had not been able to develop in a normal friendly environment. 
Fritz tortured him and, because of his appearance, he was hated and 
regarded with fear by every human being (except the little girl at the lake). 
The monster murdered Fritz, Waldman (?), the little girl and Elizabeth (?) 
and was finally destroyed by a mob of citizens (not without a final combat 
with Frankenstein himself) in a burning windmill. 
Against the background of Whale's film, it seems quite easy to define 
what is meant by the term 'Frankensteinian experiment'. It is an experi-
ment which: 
(a) violates moral boundaries. The most serious offence to basically 
Christian morality is to disregard the ontological difference 
between man and God, i.e., to commit the sin of pride (hubris). 
(b) has possibly fatal consequences for the experimenter and for the 
wider society, 
(c) is such that a prudent society would forbid it. 
This concept of Frankensteinian experiment can be interpreted so 
that a concept of Frankensteinian knowledge is gained, namely as 
knowledge that is produced by a Frankensteinian experiment. Knowledge 
of a sort that is obtainable only by immoral experiments could itself be 
immoral because of its origin and of its character: it is knowledge of how 
something immoral can be effected. Whale's film provides us with the 
example of the recombination and animation of dead bodies. The scientist 
used pre-existing knowledge and applied it in an immoral way. In the 
course of his trials he refined his methods and obtained results which 
would have been otherwise unobtainable. The resulting knowledge is at 
least in part tied inextricably to the realisation of immoral plans. Franken-
steinian knowledge would be: 
(a) knowledge to which mankind has no right. This knowledge would 
give to those who possess it a power they should not have, like the 
knowledge Eve and Adam obtained after eating of the forbidden 
fruit. Such knowledge contains the dangerous power to change 
the status of humanity for a worse state, 
(b) knowledge, whose use or application might have fatal conse-
quences and which ought to be concealed or destroyed in order to 
prevent these consequences. 
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And therefore: 
(c) knowledge that, in the context of pre-existing morality, ought not 
to be obtained. 
Before entering into the discussion of the severe problems that arise 
in attempting to use this concept of "Frankensteinian knowledge" as the 
basis of an ethics of scientific research, we should not overlook the basic « 
ambiguity of the moral message of the Frankenstein film: the figure of 
Henry Frankenstein is fascinating, in spite of his obviously immoral 
behavior. And perhaps this fascination emerges precisely because of that < > 
immorality, and not in spite of it. He has the courage to go beyond tradi-
tional boundaries, to break the constraints of a given condition. He is the 
protagonist of a form of progress that has been constitutive of modern 
culture since the Enlightenment. He is a real Baconian hero.6 <• 
I therefore propose that we add a fourth element to our definition of ^ 
Frankensteinian knowledge: 
(d) knowledge that, once obtained, might nevertheless improve the 
status of humanity in certain respects and might trigger a moral 
change. •* 
This heroic element of Frankenstein is also latent in the newspaper w 
text cited above. The title in its entirety was: "Science Mimics the , 
Movies—'Frankensteinian' Fruit Fly Experiments Point to Master Gene 
for Eye Formation." The result of the experiment is exciting. It will not 
only bring our knowledge of the genetic mechanisms of the development * 
of organs some steps further, but textbooks of evolution will also have to
 4 
be corrected. This "master control gene," i.e., a gene that switches on the 
whole cascade of some 2,500 genes of eye development, is found not only * ' 
in invertebrates such as the fruit fly, but also in vertebrates such as mice ^ 
and humans, and even in the squid. The similarities are so close that the 
corresponding mouse gene induces the very same ectopic eyes in 
Drosophila (fly eyes, not mouse eyes!). These similarities suggest that a « 
primordial eye has evolved only once, taking on manifold shapes and „ 
designs during phylogenetic diversification. Yet, scientists had long 
assumed that the eye has been invented many different times. The article 
was not an offence to the Gehring group, but a tribute to the importance «• 
of their accomplishment. The title 'Frankensteinian' pointed to this 
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founding ambivalence of important scientific discoveries: the carrying-out 
of the experiment is immoral only from the point of view of one part of 
established traditional morality. The other part praises the breakthrough as 
heroic. 
The difficulties of this "Frankensteinian ethic of scientific research" 
are obvious. They encompass at least the following four points: 
(1) The appeal to a fixed value system as the basis for the prohibition 
of certain experiments is conservative and includes no reflection on 
quality or adequateness. It seeks to defend a given social order, and takes 
this order for granted, leaving no room for dissent or development. 
(2) The decision to forbid would have to take place before fatal con-
sequences had occurred. At the same time there is rarely an absolute 
certainty that consequences will in fact prove fatal. The decision has to be 
made even though future events remain uncertain, and in the face of many 
different assessments of the risk involved. The moral rationale of the 
Frankensteinian science ethic leaves no room for a judicious weighting of 
the different appraisals of the possible hazard. Moreover, it leaves no 
room for a political dimension that could lead to a fair collective decision 
in a process today called "risk communication."7 
(3) The legal force needed to prevent agents from executing certain 
types of behaviour requires a moral legitimation. And the immorality of 
given behaviour cannot as such legitimate the use of governmental force 
to prevent it. The law—in the context of a liberal society—is distinct from 
the enforcement of morals.8 There have to be sufficiently weighty interests 
to be protected. The goal of preserving the moral integrity of a society is 
not alone a sufficiently strong criterion for the acceptance of controlling 
forces that would prevent deviant behaviour. An experiment could of 
course be prohibited if it involved criminal acts. The experiments of Hen-
ry Frankenstein were doubtless criminal: they included the ravishment of 
human bodies. But Gehring's experiments are clearly not: there are no 
laws forbidding the genetic manipulation of flies. And I doubt that we 
could find reasons good enough to legitimate a general criminalization of 
genetic engineering. Prohibition is itself a social action with moral 
qualities, and it requires justification of a sort that goes beyond the mere 
immorality of the action to be forbidden. 
An even more serious difficulty is met when it is knowledge that 
should be forbidden. To be able to formulate a prohibition, someone has 
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already to know what is to be forbidden, i.e., the knowledge has in some 
sense to be anticipated. We cannot forbid a type of knowledge without 
having a quite precise idea of what the contents of that knowledge would 
be. This would need to be at least precise enough to enable us to specify 
why that knowledge would have such and such undesirable effects. This 
is possible in some cases but not in all. The knowledge of how to animate 
recombined corpses can be described, but the theory of relativity and its 
consequences could not have been anticipated. 
(4) The ambivalence of the Frankensteinian moral is represented by 
the plurality of moral assessments encountered. Society does not speak 
with one voice: some groups might condemn a given experiment, some 
praise it, and some remain ambivalent. 
3. A myth of modern science 
Since the novel Frankenstein or the Modern Prometheus by Mary 
Wollstonecraft Shelley was published in 1818,9 hundreds of variants have 
risen; stage versions, (science) fiction stories, films, even comic strips.10 
Each tells a story around the following plot skeleton: 
(a) Frankenstein makes a living creature out of bits of corpses, 
(b) the creature turns against him and runs amok." 
Some variants share more similarities than just this core plot 
structure, but each can nevertheless be regarded as a story in its own right. 
There are few stories in our time of which nearly every adult has a quite 
precise idea, although these ideas may differ significantly in details. We 
are urged to concede that Frankenstein is something like a myth. And this 
is quite embarrassing, because the programme of modernity seems in 
principle to leave no room for myths. Modernity understands itself as the 
overcoming of mythological by rational truth. In the words of Chris 
Baldick: 
Such a thing simply should not exist, according to the most influential 
accounts of what a 'myth' i s . . . . Myth is, so the argument goes, exclusively 
a product of pre-literate cultures, from which the alienated and fragmented 
modern world of money, books, politics, and above all, scientific rationality 
is by definition cut off. . . . The more this argument rejects the possibility of 
modern myths, the more, ironically, it becomes one itself. . . .12 
The programme of modernity consisted in the ordering of the world 
and the elimination of ambivalence.13 Myths are powerful because they 
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can signify different things, because they can take on different shapes and 
are in this way able to help in providing interpretations where human 
r problems clash. It is not necessary that there be gods and goddesses in 
myths. A myth is essentially a tale, deeply rooted in a common tradition, 
formulating common desires, and most importantly serving as a medium 
through which we perceive as meaningful key situations of the real world. 
* Or, to cite L6vi-Strauss's characterization of the mythological: Poetry 
cannot be translated without serious distortion, "whereas the mythic value 
of the myth remains preserved, even through the worst translation."14 
Each translation is in consequence something like an original in its own 
right. Or better, the distinction between original and derivative has no 
clear significance. Shelley's version is not to be considered the original 
and the subsequent versions as its more or less authentic copies. Whale's 
•• film is not false or bad because its plot stands only in a very loose relation 
to that of the novel. For he was taking only the core idea—not much more 
than is expressed in the two sentences (a) and (b) above. The messages are 
different. 
What is the message of a myth like that of Frankenstein? It is not a 
true story that is here being related, and nobody believes that it is. It is not 
even any single unequivocal moral recommendation that is being con-
4 veyed. Its function is, rather, to give interpretative patterns that can give 
order to the perceived world. It makes something in the world under-
standable. We will have to look at these patterns in detail. The advantage 
of taking such mythical components in our modern rational culture 
* seriously, is that the corresponding interpretative patterns can be 
discussed, and thus they make possible a discussion on a level below that 
of moral principles, rules and value systems, namely on the level where 
the problem is perceived, ordered, and constituted as a problem. By the 
time we enter a moral discussion about questions like "Is it morally wrong 
to change the genetic sequence of an organism A in the manner X?" the 
problem to be discussed is already formulated. It is already a problem of 
* a certain type. 
One stumbling-block remains: If a scientific experiment is to be 
morally assessed on the basis of such marginalized, chaotic mythical con-
* notations, how could our discussion of this matter still claim to be 
* rational? From the point of view of established rationality there is a strong 
temptation simply to refuse any discussions on this level. As Willard 
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Gaylin argued, the "Frankenstein factor" is a frequent element in discus-
sions about recombinant DNA, and it evokes an anti-technological bias. It 
is fed by irrational fears, maintained by popular imagery, and can only 
distort a rational climate for discussion. This factor should therefore be 
eliminated.15 But how could this be done? If our claim is not completely 
false that the very structure of the ethical problem of DNA research is con-
stituted in our society with the help of the Frankenstein myth, then to « 
overlook this aspect of the process would itself be to accept a serious 
handicap to rational discussion itself. The community would have to cope 
with the corresponding moral problems without knowing how these 
problems were formulated. 
Can we embrace a more positive approach to the mythological 
dimension? Do the problems here at issue show that it is no longer self-
evident that there is only one type of "modern" rationality? We have, to 
paraphrase G. Bohme, the perceptive advantage that comes from living in 
a time in which an epoch has been left behind.16 If the programme of the 
modern epoch has been, since Francis Bacon, the systematic generation of 
knowledge and its application in technology for human ends, it was 
possibly the accompanying fear of that epoch that one might know too 
much, know things man ought not to know. The myths of Faust, the 
Sorcerer's Apprentice and Frankenstein all share in the motif of forbidden 
knowledge. They are myths of modernity, and belong to the Baconian 
programme as its shadow. 
4. Perceptive contexts 
We can now try to combine together the above elements in order to 
sketch a model of the way science is perceived in the public arena. I will 
use in my argument the concept of perceptive context by which I shall 
mean a milieu of problems, programmes and interpretative patterns 
wherein a certain event gains significance. 
As we have seen, the border between different perceptive contexts 
does not necessarily coincide with the (institutional) borderline between 
the scientific community and the public. The scientific community, like 
the public as a whole, contains people with different perceptive contexts, 
and some scientists may take the same critical view of the eyeless exper-
iment as do members of the public. The qualification of the fruit fly 
experiment as "Frankensteinian" originated from a scientist not belonging 
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to the Gehring group. And there were voices in the public who took up this 
qualification and made it serve the function of a moral condemnation of 
*• the experiment.17 Other voices in the public, on the other hand, shared the 
perceptive context of the scientists involved in the gene experiments. 
The different perceptive contexts are connected by a common object 
' of perception; the electron microphotograph of the transformed Drosophi-
» la head. This was reproduced dozens of times in journals, newspapers and 
magazines, and it was the common reference-point of distinct perceptive 
contexts. There were other microphotographs as well, documents of the 
• events and manipulations leading to the abnormal fly. We could therefore 
say that these events and manipulations serve as a connecting object of 
perception. But these events could themselves be perceived directly only 
* by the experimenters themselves, not even by all members of the labora-
* tory. A great deal of work was invested in documenting their manipu-
lations in such a way as to present the experiment in a way that could be 
grasped by the wider community. The documents acted as common ob-
jects of perception; it was the goal of their production to act in this 
fashion. 
These documents are perceived, interpreted and integrated into the 
network of problems and programmes by different perceptive contexts in 
4 different ways, and our example shows how far apart these different sig-
nifications can be. There is a strikingly radical dissociation between two 
main perceptive contexts, which I shall call the context of a "critical 
public" and the "scientific" context, respectively (in full awareness of the 
4 simplification this involves). 
To the critical public the pictures of the Drosophila are pictures of a 
monster, in the scientific auditorium they are proofs of a successful ex-
periment. These two expressions indicate the main interpretative logic in 
the two perceptive contexts. Both, the "monster" and the "proof are in-
terpretative patterns which stand in a close connection to the problems 
and programmes that constitute the respective contexts. Each presuppos-
n es a substantial background in order to be meaningful. A monster is a 
malformed organism constructed by mad (or otherwise misguided) scien-
tists or engineers and possibly able to become dangerous. Frankenstein's 
• nameless creature is the prototype thereof. The proof, on the other hand, 
.
 v is the pattern giving meaning to the same representations in the scientific 
perceptive context. It presupposes a background of developing theory, 
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> 
wherein hypotheses can be formulated and tests can be made. Specifical-
ly, the hypothesis tested here with the Drosophila experiment was whether 
eyeless acts as a "master control gene" in the cascade of molecular inter- -» 
actions and biochemical processes within the larva, leading pheno-
typically to the development of functional eyes. In other words, if the gene 
called eyeless functions as a main switch to turn on the whole machinery « 
of genes, enzymes, metabolites, regulative proteins, etc., then an activa- ,, 
tion of eyeless in places of the larva where it normally stays silent, should 
lead to the formation of ectopic eyes. And this is precisely what has been 
observed. The monster and the proof are the same fly, the same object , 
perceived, but they are completely different things for the corresponding 
perceiving subjects. 
By the term 'programme' I mean quite generally plans of what is to * 
be done.18 In the perceptive context of the critical public there is an ex- * 
pectation (or fear) that science will produce extreme examples which will 
be such as to unmask a tendency within the whole enterprise of scientific 
research. The photograph of the Drosophila monster is utilized as an es- < 
pecially clear symbolic example standing for more than simply the 
portrayed recombinant fruit fly. The fly with its ectopic eyes represents all 
of genetic engineering, even the whole of molecular biology. In the scien-
tific context, on the other hand, there is a programme of measuring, of t-
collecting data. The photograph of the Drosophila is translated into a set 
of sentences that can be incorporated into the body of knowledge. The in-
formation contained in the photo is joined to the results of other scientific < 
operations. The corresponding knowledge will be incorporated into
 ¥ 
textbooks; it will be updated and further research planned. Each success-
ful experiment gives rise to a variety of new research questions and * 
hypotheses. 
The term background of issues is used to describe a 'problem' seen 
as urgent. In the perceptive context of the critical public the alienated re-
lationship between man and nature, the ecological problems of con- " 
temporary scientific and technological society are seen as being of impor- *, 
tance. The right of man to use nature is questioned and consequently the 
dignity of the animal subject is considered not negligible. How is it to be 
such a recombinant fly? Does it suffer! Has a fly the right not to be •* 
manipulated in such a way? The background problems of the scientific ^ , 
context, in contrast, arise from gaps in our knowledge about how a 
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complex organism develops, how it succeeds in organizing itself from the 
zygote to an adult fly. Problems lie also in other dimensions: the evolution 
of eyes in the different phyla of the animal kingdom. Problems can also 
be seen in the area of philosophy: how should we imagine the functional 
role of genes in the cell—as an essence of life, a coded blueprint of the 
animal, or as interactive systemic partners with other cell components 
involved in cascades of biochemical reactions? 
interpretative pattern 
programme 
problem 
perceptive contexts 
scientific public 
proof 
measurement, 
data collection 
(informative value) 
missing knowledge 
critical public 
monster 
critique 
(symbolic value) 
ecological crisis 
animals as sentient 
subjects 
Fig. 2: The elements of perceptive contexts. Two groups of people perceiving the same 
recombinant fruit fly. 
The model here outlined in only preliminary fashion (see Fig. 2) 
could perhaps help to understand how a situation can emerge wherein an 
experiment is seen as scandalous, forbidden, etc. in one perceptive context 
and as a major breakthrough in another. The described situation reveals a 
communicative crisis of contemporary science. The two perceptive con-
texts lead to incommensurable perspectives. Arguments can only rarely be 
understood by both sides, and consequently moral discourse is blocked. 
My impression is that the last word in this case has not yet been spoken. 
We need a fundamental reflection on perceptive contexts and on the defi-
ciencies in each. 
5. Another Frankensteinian ethic 
A completely different approach to the problem of monstrosity is 
offered by Mary Shelley's classic novel. There, the processes that lead to 
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the strange experimentation of the young physician Victor Frankenstein in 
his solitary laboratory are made transparent. 
There is a detailed description of all the alienating events that allow 
and encourage Victor to plan and execute such a horrible project. Both his 
father and Elizabeth are uninterested in his arduous studies of Agrippa and 
Albertus Magnus. "My dreams were therefore undisturbed by reality."(23)19 
In this situation of intellectual loneliness he took up the goal of finding 
"the elixir of life": "what glory would attend the discovery, if I could 
banish disease from the human frame, and render man invulnerable to any 
but a violent death!" (ibid.) 
During two years of study in his chemical laboratory at Ingolstadt he 
"paid no visit to Geneva" (32), where his family and friends lived. And for 
purely technical reasons he decided to make his key experiment of 
"bestowing animation upon lifeless matter" (34) with a being of abnormal 
size: 
As the minuteness of the parts formed a great hindrance to my speed, I re-
solved, contrary to my first intention, to make the being of a gigantic stature; 
that is to say, about eight feet in height, and proportionably large. (35) 
He collected bones and bodies from the charnel houses and worked 
with these in his cell at the top of the house. The summer months passed 
while he was thus engaged. 
It was a most beautiful season; never did the fields bestow a more plentiful 
harvest, or the vines yield a more luxuriant vintage: but my eyes were insen-
sible to the charms of nature. (37) 
These hints at Victor's insensibility are frequent. The dramatic core 
of the novel is the failing relationship between Victor and his creature. 
Victor's first reaction, after the creature opened his eyes, was to run away. 
"Unable to endure the aspect of the being I had created, I rushed out of the 
room" (39). 
Only then did he begin to see his creature as a "monster" (or a 
"fiend," "devil," "wretch"). Perception changed. In the beginning he had 
selected the creature's features as "beautiful," but after the animation and 
after his flight from his own creation he saw it as "miserable." The whole 
story following that act of creation is the drama of Victor Frankenstein's 
flight from the relationship with his creation. And because of his appear-
ance the creature could find no human relationship with any other human 
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being either (except the blind old man in the cottage). These continuous 
frustrations produced in the creature a strong and hate-filled desire for 
revenge—a revenge not against man in general but against his creator. 
The essence of Shelley's analysis can, I think, be formulated as fol-
lows: monstrosity is a consequence of dissociation, dissociation in central 
human relationships. It is even possible to see the figure of the creature as 
a "Doppelganger" of the scientist Frankenstein. 
6. Conclusions 
From the Shelleyan point of view the offence of the fruit-fly experi-
ment would not be its definable monstrosity and its illegitimacy, but the 
dissociation of the two perceptive contexts and the difficulty of commu-
nication between them. From a non-dissociated perspective, both patterns 
of interpreting this experiment would have mixed in some elements of the 
other: the scientific arena would not only see the fly as a proof of its 
theories but also as a symbol leading to a critical reflection about its own 
goals and about the cultural backgrounds of a science which remain un-
questioned only for the scientists themselves. And the critical public 
would see not only the monster in the portrait, but would also gain insights 
into the complexity of organic development and a new respect for the 
ingenuity of nature. 
A non-alienated science might perhaps have other cultural ideals and 
would consequently develop other research preferences. We can only 
speculate what kind of experiments a developmental biology would prefer 
to make and how it would communicate them to the public if the situation 
of dissociated signification was overcome. 
To conclude, the analysis of a mythical term like "Frankensteinian" 
can take us to the heart of the ethical problem of immorality in scientific 
and technological progress. The term was introduced, almost accidental-
ly, to describe a single experiment, but it is quite generally revealing, and 
I am sure I have not exhausted its significance with my few remarks in this 
essay. 
What are "monsters"? The word is built from the latin verb mon-
strare: to show. If we perceive something as "monstrous," this fact shows 
something. Monsters are perceptive indicators. One thing indicated is the 
dissociation of relationships between the scientists working in their own 
perceptive framework. The other is the problematical relationship of 
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modern science to its objects. Nature is perceived in a very artificial 
setting—as a mere object of research. To be aware of this does not lead to 
a moral condemnation of the individual genetic engineers, but to a dis-
cussion of the alienated relationship between man and nature. In such a 
reflective undertaking at least some of the researchers could be won as 
partners, not as adversaries. The ideal relationship to nature has not yet 
been found. I am sure, it will contain many facets and science will find a 
place therein.20 
Christoph Rehmann-Sutter 
University of Basel 
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